Aims of the paper (Threefold) Aims of the paper (Threefold) First, analyzing the new MTO methodology and discuss critical aspects of the d liti t t k b d t li biliti modalities to take on board government liabilities.
Second, assessing the impact of the crisis on the current and future MTOs, showing the incidence of debt, growth, and cost of ageing on the budgetary g , g , g g g y targets that EU Member States are committed to achieve.
Third, providing a simple alternative approach to introduce domestic/external i b l i h MTO d i i h h i i f bli d b imbalances into the MTO determination such as the composition of public debt by maturity, the structure of the private sector indebtedness, and financial market conditions.
The institutional framework of new MTO methodology gy
The legal basis of the new MTOs.
From an one-rule-fits-all approach ("medium-term budgetary position close to balance or in surplus" clause) to a country-specific approach taking into account differences across countries in their economic fundamentals and risks to public-p finance sustainability.
MTO differentiation must consider the countries' government debt and implicit li bili i ( i ll h i d i h i i l d di ) liabilities (especially those associated with rising age-related expenditure), potential growth, and a safety margin.
Euro Area MS should declare MTOs in a range between a structural deficit of 1 g per cent of GDP and a balanced or in-surplus structural balance depending on their public debt level and potential growth. MTODi is the target declared by country i, MTOMB is the minimum benchmark, i.e. the safety margin that prevents y g p breaching the 3% GDP ceiling under normal cyclical circumstances ;
MTOEAi is the commitment Euro Area and ERM II Countries to achieve at least a structural deficit of 1 percent of GDP least a structural deficit of 1 percent of GDP MTOSMi is the country-specific MTO that links sustainability of public finances and budgetary manoeuvre granted to low-debt countries. This parameter has g y g p been determined through an algorithm.
A calibrated model for the MTO determination: the MTOSM MTOSM The Code of Conduct gives some indications on how to calculate the MTOSM according to 3 components. g p 1. the budget balance that stabilises the debt-to-GDP ratio at 60 percent given a country's long-term growth rate of potential GDP;
2. a supplementary debt-reduction effort for countries whose debt exceeds 60 percent of GDP; 3 a proportion of the adjustment needed to cover the present value 3.
a proportion of the adjustment needed to cover the present value of the future increase in age-related expenditure (i.e. the cost of ageing). 
Main advantages of the new methodology:
The algorithm is not revealed but it provides more transparency, simplicity and ownership. Quantification of both explicit (public debt levels ) and implicit (cost of Quantification of both explicit (public debt levels ) and implicit (cost of ageing) government s' liabilities.
On explicit liabilities as determinants of MTOs: the additional debt requirement parameter disting ishes bet een lo debt and high debt co ntries pro iding larger parameter distinguishes between low-debt and high-debt countries providing larger margin of manoeuvre to the former. On implicit liabilities in the MTOs: total or partial frontloading of the cost of i b h b d f i i h j d i i ageing ensures both a budgetary safety margin against the projected increase in agerelated expenditure and improve ownership. Minimum degree of frontloading is required from all EU countries, so as not to k h i i i l i f weaken the incentives to implement pension reforms. MTOs could be revised regularly(every 3 years) and in any case after major structural reforms having an impact on age-related expenditures. 
Main weaknesses of the new methodology
The MTO algorithm does not provide the symmetry condition between explicit and implicit liabilities in the long-term solvency equation of the government. government.
Example: let consider a country with a Debt-to-GDP ratio equal to 100% which undertakes a pension reform that increases primary balance permanently by 0.5 p p p.p.. The S2E indicator improves by the same amount but, given a 0.33 pp degree of frontloading, the MTOMT improves by only 0.17pp whereas the NPV of the permanent improvement in primary balance is 33 3% of GDP permanent improvement in primary balance is 33.3% of GDP. by reducing the debt by 33.3% of GDP implies a decline in MTOMT by 1.09 pp. The impact of the financial and economic crisis on MTO The impact of the financial and economic crisis on MTO (1) Declared MTO: 'no comm.' indicates that no commitment is explicitly made by the country in the SCP; 'n.a.' indicates SCP is not available.
(2) Date to achieve MTO: 'n.d.' indicates that the date of achievement is not declared in the SCP; 't.p.p.' indicates the MTO is achieved throughout the programme period; 'n.a.' indicates the SCP is not available (3) For Denmark and Netherlands, distance to the central point of MTO range; for Slovakia, distance to the minimum value of MTO range.
In 2007 SPC many MS at MTO. In 2008 lenghtening the period for achieving targets. Current MTOs have been set using the latest AWG projections of potential growth and age-related expenditure elaborated early in 2008 which do not take into account the effects of the crisis.
To address the lack of realism we use potential output and cost of ageing of the lost decade scenario, which envisages lower growth rates of potential GDP for all EU countries until 2020. Conditional on the materialisation of current projections on debt and potential growth, tighter MTOs is a likely outcome for the next round of revision in 2012.
The current debate on exit strategies for EU Member States should consider that future MTOs will become more demanding due to the actual deterioration of public finance and growth conditions
The exposure index: an alternative to the supplementary debt effort debt effort.
Public sector: level, composition of debt in terms of residual maturity and the share held by nonresident investors Banking sector's risk exposure on assets: debtors' characteristics (counterparty risk) separating credit to domestic agents and to foreigners (developed vs developing countries) .
Funding pressures facing the banking sector: banks' total debt, the share of debt maturing in the next three years, and the ratio between total domestic loans and domestic deposits.
Sectoral imbalances: net borrowing position of four sectors -households, non-financial corporate, d financial corporate, and the general government External imbalances: net borrowing position of the economy and the debt composition by maturity aggregated across the four sectors.
For each subsector we ranked the performance of all countries from the best grading 1 to the worst performer grading 10. We averaged the w p g g W v g single sub-component scores along all the dimensions and ranked the countries accordingly over a [0, 1] interval. (1) Declared MTO: 'no comm ' indicates that no commitment is explicitly made by the country in the SCP; 'n a ' indicates SCP is not available MTOMT*s with exposure index are more or less demanding depending on the assessment of i b l i th b ki fi i l p t d h h ld t (ti ht t t f IE)
(1) Declared MTO: no comm. indicates that no commitment is explicitly made by the country in the SCP; n.a. indicates SCP is not available.
Sources: For both no-crisis and lost decade scenarios, the average nominal potential GDP growth rates over 2010-2060 and S2E imbalances in the banking, financial corporate, and household sectors (tighter target for IE).
High-debt countries with low underlying sectoral imbalances converge to a minimum budgetary target less stringent than what estimated using the supplementary debt-reduction effort (see IT and to some extent EL)
